Impiety in Epigraphic Evidence

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to highlight several features of the concept of impiety (σημένεια) and of its use in inscriptions. Two main types of epigraphic texts mention impiety: 1. preventive laws, where formulations such as σημένεια ἔστω, σημείωμα and ἔνεικτις ἔστω σημείωσα have a double effect inasmuch as they categorize an offence as an impiety and, in addition, they give a culprit the status of impious and 2. reports of trials or of past wrongs. Being regarded as impious entails other consequences on the relationship between the culprit and gods but also between the culprit and the human community – the main issue being that these consequences are seldom explicitly mentioned. Moreover, instead of a single law or text defining impiety or proceedings to take place in case of impiety, there is an array of texts in which impiety appears, the sum of which forms what a community would legally recognize as an impiety.

Résumé : Cet article vise à mettre en exergue différentes particularités du concept d'impiété (σημένεια) et de son utilisation dans les inscriptions. Deux types principaux de textes épigraphiques mentionnent l'impiété : 1. des lois préventives, dans lesquelles des formulations telles que σημένεια ἔστω, σημείωμα et ἔνεικτις ἔστω σημείωσα ont un double effet dans la mesure où elles définissent une infraction comme étant une impiété et, de surcroît, elles confèrent au coupable le statut d'impiété et 2. des rapports de procès ou de torts commis par le passé. Être considéré impie entraîne d'autres conséquences, dans la relation du coupable avec les dieux mais également avec la communauté humaine – le problème étant principalement que ces conséquences sont rarement explicitement mentionnées. De plus, au lieu d'une loi unique définissant l'impiété ou envisageant les procédures à mettre en place en cas d'impiété, il y a un ensemble de textes dans lesquels apparait l'impiété, dont la somme forme ce qu'une communauté reconnaîtrait légalement comme impiété.

The concept of impiety (σημένεια) in ancient Greek religion is complex. Firstly, definitions provided by ancient authors themselves point out, as potential victims of an impious act, different actors whose connections with each other do not seem a priori obvious to us, such as gods and parents.¹ It was

¹ I am extremely grateful to Prof. Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge, Angelos Chaniotis and Robert Parker for their helpful criticisms on earlier drafts of this paper. Many thanks to Dr. Beate Dignas and Charles Crowther for their interest in my research and their support. Athina Mitropoulos and Justine Potts have kindly contributed to the improvement of my English. Any remaining error is mine.

¹ See in particular Ἀριστοτέλης, Virtus et vices, 1251a: “There are three types of offence (ἀθηματία): impiety, greediness (σαρασάνεια) and outrage (ἀθηματία). Impiety is a fault (ἀθηματία) regarding gods, daemons or deceased persons, parents or homeland”, and Polybius, XXXVI, 9: “Impiety means committing a wrong (ἀθηματίαν) in respect of what is related to gods, parents and deceased persons”: A common point between these elements is that normally they should all be granted a certain amount of honour (τιμή). Σημένεια can thus be seen as a lack of τιμή.
similarly problematic for ancient authors to define piety as well as impiety, as is obvious in Plato’s *Euthyphro*. Moreover, modern scholarship has mostly focused on the legal treatment of impiety and on Athenian case studies, such as Socrates and other philosophers’ alleged trials for impiety. This focus has led to two assumptions: being impious could only bring an individual to be prosecuted in a court and, since most of the impious individuals studied by scholars would be philosophers, impiety was intrinsically linked to atheism or, at least, to a problem of *νομίζων τούς θεούς*.

I am convinced that several essential aspects of impiety have been neglected through these approaches. This paper cannot claim comprehensiveness, but I would like to focus on a specific issue: the use of impiety in epigraphic documentary evidence. Impiety is an offence, an *δίκαια* – i.e., to put it crudely, a wrong that you might do and that is likely to be punished in some way. Imperative formulations used in preventive laws, such as *σεβετε καὶ σεβετος* and *σεβετε καὶ ἠθικος* σεβετος *δικαιτε*, categorize a given *δίκαια* as an impiety, but also imply that from now on the culprit will be regarded as impious, and this status will

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2 On this dialogue, see L. BRUUT ZAIDMAN, *Le commerce des dieux : eusebeia, essai sur la piété en Grèce antique*, Paris, 2001, p. 154-157. One could object to my statement that not much could easily be defined with an interlocutor such as Socrates.


5 Impiety will be the topic of my doctoral research, entitled “Transgression of Norm in Ancient Greek Religion in Classical, Hellenistic and Roman Periods: the Case of Impiety.”

6 The link between *ἀσέβεια* and *ἀθησία* is obvious in some statements, though clearly on a rhetorical level. See e.g. the parallel in Andocides, *On the mysteries*, 31: τα τιμωρήσατε μεν τούς *ἀσεβετες*, νομίζετε τα τούς μορφάν *ἀθησειας*; ibid., 132: νόν τα *ἀσέβεια* και *ἀθησία* ἔστων αἰς τὰ λέγε.
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legitimize the application of sanctions from other members of the community. In other words, ἀσέβης ἵστω, “let him be impious”, should be understood as a shorter version of “let him be punished as one who is regarded as impious”.7 Far from being a simple linguistic twist, the connection between committing an ἀσέβης and being ἀσέβης has not insignificant consequences for how we should understand impiety and its implications in Greek society, as well as the Greek legal system in general.

Obviously elliptic formulations in “adjective + ἵστω” in preventive laws are not restricted to impiety, and it is probably wise to consider that what is said here about ἀσέβης cannot be systematically applied to other concepts. For example we have several attestations of ἀνόσος ἵστω. In these cases, however, ἀνόσος designates an object, not a person.8 Moreover, the term ἰστος is used a lot, especially in the expression τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ἵστοι9, but surprisingly its antonym is quite rare in epigraphic texts. This suggests that the difference between ἀνόσος and ἀσέβης is more important than usually thought or at least shown in translations.10 Moreover, there are also many examples of ἰερόσυλος ἵστω, to which I will return below, and τυμβωρόχος ἵστω, in epitaphs from Asia Minor, which I will pass over in the present paper.

Studying the way ancient Greeks delimited the concept of impiety is of first importance, as it may help us avoid being trapped in a problem of inaccuracy quite common in modern scholarship: impiety has often been discussed even in cases where ancient authors did not mention it. A striking example is the so-called Diopithes’ decree, the historicity of which will not be discussed here.11

7 I would like to thank A. Chaniotis for drawing my attention on this point.
8 We find several curse tablets where an object stolen from someone is said to be ἰστος if given back to its owner, or ἀσέβης if remains in the thieves’ hands: see IK Knidos 149, ll. 3-7: ὅπως ἔλθω | τες παραβαίνει παρὰ Δωκικέα | ὅπως ἔποιηθεν, ἄλλ’ ἢ το | στηριγμόν | ἐστο ἐν ἰστοι, τοῖς | ἐκ μὴ ἄποδοθα ἵστα. For a similar expression in an official text, see IK Rhod. Peraia 251, ll. 40-44: τοῦ δὲ στηριγμοὶ ἀνὰ | τὰ ἱερών μὴ ἵστοι | [ἢ] ἐν τοῖς στηριγμοῖς | τοῦ ἰεροῦ ἵστος ποιὸ τὸ | [θείῳ]. On ἰστοι money, see J. Blok, “Deme Accounts and the Meaning of Ἰοσία Money in Fifth-Century Athens”, Mnemosyne 4th series 15 (2010), p. 61-93.
10 The difference between ἰστος and ἰστοι is best expressed in A. Motte, “L’expression du sacré dans la religion grecque”, in J. Rits (ed.), L’expression du sacré dans les grandes religions, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986, p. 168: ἰστος denotes the inner part of an individual’s cultic behaviour, whereas ἰερὸς exprime davantage l’idée d’un ordre sacré auquel une conduite pieuse doit se soumettre et dont elle est en quelque sorte libérée lorsqu’ont été accomplis les gestes requis.”
This short regulation is often mentioned as example of a text about impiety, but it does not even mention the word ἁσέβεια or any related word.\(^{12}\) The following question therefore arises: should we consider that ἁσέβεια is implicit in texts where it is not mentioned?\(^{13}\)

Moreover, studying impiety is rewarding inasmuch as it gives another insight of Greek religion than its antonym: piety. Obviously, being a positive, praised concept, ἁσέβεια does not entail any sanction, but the point is that ἁσέβεια ἐστιν is in itself a useless formula. It is commonly accepted that one has to be ἁσέβειας: ἁσέβεια should be everyone’s goal and, accordingly, speaking about ἁσέβεια necessarily entails a description and a prescription at the same time.\(^{14}\) One never finds in an inscription ἁσέβειας ἐστιν, simply because ἐστιν is, in a way, useless.\(^{15}\)

Of course ἁσέβεια also entails an understood prescription: one must not be impious. But the real point to make is that ἁσέβεια and ἁσεβεία are not used in the same contexts. ἁσεβεία can be used to dissuade anyone to contravene a regulation, whereas ἁσέβεια is a goal in itself: a city takes decisions regarding the cult because its members are pious, someone is crowned publicly because he is pious, etc. However one will never find a regulation such as “if someone acts so, he shall be pious”. What can happen, though, is the public recognition of someone’s piety, with all the positive social consequences it may imply. Accordingly, ἁσέβεια should not be considered as a mere antonym of ἁσεβεία, but as a concept allowing us to explore Greek religion through unusual paths.\(^{16}\)

In the present paper, I will take into account inscriptions mentioning explicitly impiety, in which we have an attestation of the abstract noun ἁσεβεία, the verb ἁσεβεῖν or the adjective ἁσεβὴς. Specifically, I will first discuss several preventive

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\(^{14}\) However one can find examples where someone has to prove that he is pious, which is equivalent to proving that you are not impious. See the law of the *erēnæí* in Athens: IG II² 1369, ll. 31-36: [μηδὲν ξέστω ἱττόφυλον ἰππότην | σύνδεσθαι τοῦ θεραπευτῆν χωρὶς ἐν δοκίμια| μακάρι | ἐκ οὗ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἁσεβείας | ἐν δοκίμια| δοκιμασθεὶς τῶν δὲ ἐν προστάτης [καὶ] | ἐκ τῆς ἱεραρχίας καὶ ἁγιασμοῦ | οἱ ταμίαι καὶ σύνθεσις. The idea that officials of the clan of *erēnæí* are involved in the process of checking that someone is pious may imply that *a contrario* it was possible to find out somewhere, in public lists or through common knowledge, whether or not someone was impious.

laws or regulations where the culprit of an offence is declared impious and, subsequently, texts where someone is punished for impiety. I will then address the connections between both cases and question the legal definition of impiety.

**Preventive expressions: ἁσεβὴς ἔστω, ἁσεβεῖτω and ἔνοχος ἔστω ἁσεβεῖς**

Let us first look at preventive texts, where ἁσεβεῖα is mentioned in a future and hypothetical context concerning what shall or should happen if an offence is committed. Firstly, in a cult regulation from Cos (end of 5th century BC), we can read:

\[16\]

_αἱ τις κα τάμνη τὰς κυπαρίσσιους
 τὰς ἐν τοῖς τεμένεις ἢ τὰς ἔξω τοῖς
 τεμένεσι ἢ χώρη τὰ ξύλα ἐκ τοῦ
tοῦ τεμένους τὰ χυμοφιάζον, χι·
λίας δραχμᾶς ἀποτεισθῶ καὶ ἐν
τὸ ἱερὸ ἁσεβεῖτω._

If someone cuts cypresses in the _temenos_ or out of the _temenos_, or carries away some pieces of cypress out of the _temenos_, he shall pay a thousand drachmae and be impious in regard to the sanctuary.

The verb ἁσεβεῖν is used in a prescriptive clause and in the imperative mood. It therefore does not describe what happens or has happened, but what shall happen if someone does not respect the regulation. It is also linked to a fine (χιλιάς δραχμάς ἀποτεισθῶ). The specific meaning of τὸ ἱερὸν ἁσεβεῖν, “being impious in regard to the sanctuary”, is hard to define as such, but its role in the text, along with the mentioned fine, can be interpreted as follows: it assimilates the fact of carrying away pieces of wood to an impious act and, given the imperative mood and the similarity with the formulation of the fine, it also implies that being recognized as impious is the basis on which sanctions shall follow. It can explain why there are apparently two consequences to carrying away pieces of wood, i.e. paying a fine and being regarded as impious: as you are impious, it is legitimate to levy a fine from you. Both consequences are thus not unconnected. Besides, being impious must have implied a rupture of your normal personal relationship with the gods – otherwise why would one be declared “impious in regard to the sanctuary”? – but I will leave this matter aside here.

There are other examples of this sort. In a famous decree from Lindos (Rhodes, AD 22) concerning the restoration of finances for the cult of Athena Lindia and Zeus Polieus, several measures are taken in order to ensure more income for the cult. Sanctions are envisaged in case such measures were not respected.\[17\] These measures concern, for instance, persons becoming priest by adoption:

\[16\] _LYCG_ 150. For a more up to date commentary, see the recently published _IG_ XII 4, 283.

\[17\] _LSS_ 90.
and who becomes priest by adoption shall inevitably act in everything as the other priests, or he shall be impious towards the goddess and liable to the fines foreseen against persons stealing the money.

The expression Ἀσθεῖς ἔστω, though in a lacuna, is fairly well-founded, since it is attested in two other places in this decree, the first being for an offence which has not been conserved on the stone:

And no one, either a magistrate or an individual, shall be allowed to say or submit an amendment to the decree or to make a proposal according to which this money should be used for another purpose, or to annihilate the income of the goddess, or he will be destroyed and accursed, himself and his genos, and he shall be impious towards the goddess and shall owe ten thousand drachmae to be consecrated to Athena.

Λσθείς ἔστω should be understood in the same way as Ἀσθεῖτω. Furthermore, in the same inscription from Lindos, we also encounter the expression Ἕνοχος ἔστω Ἀσθείτω twice:

The ones who paid for the inscriptions shall not be allowed to carry the statues from the top in any way and under any pretext or they shall be liable to impiety.
The ones who promised (to pay) shall do everything in the same way as the other hierothutai, or they shall be liable to impiety.

The obvious question to raise is the following: since we have ἁμαρτήσατε three times and ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ ἁμαρτάτειξ twice, is there a difference between these expressions? The adjective ἁμαρτάς is frequent in regulations. The idea of culpability is clear, but it is not so easy to determine at which stage of culpability the adjective is to be situated. Should it be translated as “liable to” or “guilty of”? In most cases it is followed by a term in the dative case. One can, for instance, be ἁμαρτάς τῷ φόνῳ ἁμαρτήσατε or ἁμαρτάς ἄμαρτήσατε, which is to be translated as “guilty of the murder” or “wrongdoings”; but we also encounter expressions such as ἁμαρτάς τῷ νόμῳ, which cannot be translated as “guilty of the law” but rather “liable to the law”. Unfortunately this ambiguity complicates our reasoning about impiety even more. In the decree from Lindos, should we translate “guilty of impiety” or “liable to a charge of impiety”?

It is quite striking that in the five occurrences of ἁμαρτάτειξ in the decree, the first two follow the pattern ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ ἁμαρτάτειξ whereas the following three use ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ. It is therefore tempting to interpret this as a mere variation of the stonemason or rather of the draftsman, who would have switched to another expression at some point. On a general level, decrees were not aimed at a group of philologists who would consider such subtle variations to be relevant. Besides, if we look at the offences concerned by both expressions, nothing in them can lead us to think that these two expressions would have different meanings: no offence can be interpreted as more serious than the other ones. There is, however, a difference: ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ emphasizes the status of the culprit, whereas in ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ ἁμαρτάτειξ, impiety is presented as an offence but the culprit is not said to be impious. The fact that with ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ gods are mentioned — someone is impious towards (ποτε) the goddess —, which is not the case with ἁμαρτάς ἐστώ ἁμαρτάτειξ, also suggests that, in this decree at least, you can be impious only towards a referent. ἁμαρτάτειξ as an offence, on the other hand, does not need any precision.

What do “being regarded as impious” or “being liable to impiety” imply? Does it involve additional sanctions not mentioned in the inscription? To solve this issue, it is interesting to look at a famous decree from Gambreion (Mysia) concerning funerary regulations. Several points are regulated, for men and

18 Antiphon, On the murder of Herodes, 68.
19 Aeschines, On the embassy, 146.
20 Demosthenes, Against Leptines, 156; Plato, Laws IX, 869b.
21 LSAM 16.
women respectively, such as clothing and duration of mourning. At the end of the decree, it is specified:

\[
\text{το\(\in\)}\ \text{δε\ } μη\ \text{πεθο-}
\text{μενοις\ μη\ δε\ τα\(\in\)}\ \text{εμμενο\(\in\)}\ οοδεωσης\ τα-
\text{ναιτα\ } και\ \text{μη\ δο\(\in\)}\ οον\ \text{αυτςις\ ε\(\in\)}\ άναι, \text{ως}
\text{α\(\in\)}\ \text{σεβο\(\in\)}\ οοσης\ \text{θεινω\ } \text{μη\ } \text{θεων\ } \text{ε\(\in\)}\ οτι\ \text{δε}
\text{κα\ έτη}
\]

And to the men who do not abide by the rules and the women who do not respect them, the contrary (shall be wished); and it shall not be licit to these women, as they are impious, to sacrifice to any of the gods for ten years.

The expression \(\text{ως\ } \text{α\(\in\)}\ \text{σεβο\(\in\)}\ οοσης\), followed by the ban from sacrifice, is of utmost interest. The conjunction \(\text{ως\ }\) indicates at the same time a status and the cause of the main sanction, and the expression can therefore be translated as “in their quality of impious” or “as they are impious”. Not only would the women’s lack of respect of the regulations lead them to be impious, but this quality would imply their exclusion from any sacrificial procedure in the ten years to come. In my opinion, the expression \(μη\ \text{δο\(\in\)}\ \text{οον\ } \text{αυτςις\ ε\(\in\)}\ άναι\) entails a sanction on a double level. Firstly, the communication between these impious women and gods to whom they sacrifice will not be efficient anymore; in other words, their sacrifice will be pointless.\(^{22}\) Moreover, although assuming a systematic exclusion of these women from sanctuaries may be debatable, it is likely that someone could rightly expel them from a sanctuary if he wanted to, precisely because these women would have been officially recognized as impious.\(^{23}\)

The notion of \(\text{α\(\in\)}\ \text{σεβε\(\in\)}\ έ\(\in\)}\ is absolutely central: if these women were not considered impious, they would probably still be allowed to sacrifice.\(^{24}\) I think that, in this case, in spite of a different formulation, we are really close to the formulae \(\text{α\(\in\)}\ \text{σεβε\(\in\)}\ έ\(\in\)}\ and \(\text{άνοιχ\(\in\)}\ \text{δο\(\in\)}\ \text{οον\ } \text{α\(\in\)}\ \text{σεβε\(\in\)}\ έ\(\in\)}\). With the formula \(\text{ως\ } \text{α\(\in\)}\ \text{σεβο\(\in\)}\ οοσης\), \(μη\ \text{δο\(\in\)}\ \text{οον\ } \text{ε\(\in\)}\ οτι\(\in\).\) the people from Gambreion mean: “the women are impious (= offence) and, by this statement, we consider they are also sanctioned, in this case with a ban from sacrifice (= sanction)”. The response of the community is to

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\(^{22}\) On this point, see H.S. Versnel, “‘May he not be able to sacrifice…’. Concerning a Curious Formula in Greek and Latin Curses”, ZPE 58 (1985), p. 247-269 and especially p. 248-249, where it is assumed that “(priestly) supervisors” were appointed to control the participation to sacrifices.

\(^{23}\) Compare with the evidence provided in A. Chaniotis, “Conflicting Authorities. Asylia between Secular and Divine Law in the Classical and Hellenistic Poleis”, Kernos 9 (1996), p. 65-86. Some people were excluded from sanctuaries because of their pollution (see p. 72-75). A law from Eresos (LSCG 124) mentions that only pious people may enter the sacred precinct (l. 12: \(\text{σεβε\(\in\)}\ έ\(\in\)}\) which indicates that impious persons may not. How this exclusion was enforced is another problem. The role of priests in expelling suppliant slaves is evident (see p. 79-83), but the evidence is not so clear about how impious persons who would try to gain access to a sanctuary could be traced.

\(^{24}\) A very similar expression is attested in Patras in the third cent. BC (\(\text{LSV}\) 33, ll. 8-11); ε\(\in\) δε να \(\text{παρβαλλε\(\in\)}\ το\(\in\) | \(\text{παρβαλλε\(\in\)}\) το\(\in\) να \(\text{παρβαλλε\(\in\)}\) το | \\(\text{παρβαλλε\(\in\)}\) το. The translation in B. Le Guen-Pollet, \text{La vie religieuse dans le monde grec du 1er au 3e \(\text{si\(\in\)}\)}\ \text{cle avant notre \(\text{erre\(\in\)}\)}\ : \text{choix de documents épigraphiques traduits et comment\(\in\)}\ \text{és}, Toulouse, 1991, p. 82: “comme si la coupable avait commis une impiété” is wrong. The culprit has really committed an impiety and \(\text{ως\ }\) does not denote a comparison, but a cause.
classify this lack of respect as an impiety, which intrinsically entails a sanction. We can thus explain the elliptic formula ἁσεβῆς ἢ ἢςτο: the sanction against you is that the offence you committed is considered an impiety, you are punished in the sense that the community considers that you have committed an impiety and are impious. Other sanctions may be specified, but are not essential.

However, the fact that other sanctions are seldom specified cannot be used as an argument to assume that there were no other sanctions implied by the status of an impious person. A decree from Teos (2nd century BC) attests a very interesting formula concerning ἱεροσύλος:25

[ὁ δὲ ἠπατήσατο ἤ [πρῇ]-
[ἑὰς τι παρὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον ἢ μὴ ποιήσας τι τῶν προστατευμένων ἐν τοῖς
νόμων τῶν ἔξωλος εἶναι καθὼς καὶ γένος τὸ ἄθικον καὶ ἱεροσύλος καὶ συν-
τελείαθα πάντα καὶ αὐτὸν ἔπαρ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς παρὶ ἱεροσύλῳ γεγραμμένα ἑαυτῷ]

If someone makes a proposal, breaks this law or does not follow one of the points prescribed in this law, he shall be destroyed himself and his gens and he shall be sacrilegious, and what is written in the laws concerning the sacrilegious person shall apply to him.

In a single sentence, ἱεροσύλος is used both in a preventive construction (ἐστι ἱεροσύλος) and in a descriptive expression (παρὶ ἱεροσύλου). Committing a sacrilege and being regarded as sacrilegious, just as in the case of impiety, have strong connections: you shall be sacrilegious and everything written about sacrilegious persons shall apply to you, because you have committed an act considered as a sacrilege. Besides, the sanctions entailed by impiety cannot be associated automatically with a trial. The essence of a trial is that someone’s culpability is decided through a process involving judges, whatever the form of this process. The formulation “he shall be impious” leaves however no possibility – or more precisely – no need for such a trial. It is decided from the very beginning that someone acting so would be impious.

In the decree from Lindos, discussed above, even an expression such as ἱνοχεῖς ἢςτω ἁσεβεῖς does not involve a trial. Whatever its precise meaning, ἱνοχεῖς does not mean that you are guilty because you have been condemned in a trial. Several cases suggest that persons are considered ἱνοχεῖ of a wrongdoing even without having been prosecuted.26 Accordingly, you can be said to have committed an impiety on the spot, just by acting illegally.

25 PEP Teos 41.
26 See e.g. Xenophon, Hellenics VII, 7, where several men are condemned to death for behaving as tyrants and committing a murder. One of them, Euphron, was not condemned. However, according to Xenophon, he was not less ἱνοχεῖ than the other men (οἵτων καὶ Ἑλλήνων πάσσ τούτων ἱνοχεῖ ἢ).
This point of view can be confirmed by a law from Ialysos (Rhodes, c. 300 BC) about the introduction of animals into the sanctuary of Alektrona.27 The last lines of the text are the following:

Anyone breaking the law shall clean the sanctuary and the temenos and shall offer a sacrifice, or he shall be liable to this impiety; if he brings cattle as well, he shall pay for each head of cattle one obol; anyone who wishes shall report someone doing so to the mastrii.

The formulation here is quite peculiar, because any potential offender is confronted to a choice: either he has to clean the sanctuary and offer a sacrifice, or he shall be accounted impious.28 The culprit does not have to choose between two equal sanctions though: ἐντὸς ἀπειρέτω is applicable only if the first sanction is not respected and is also more serious. The person concerned by ἀπειρέτω would therefore be guilty on a double level: for not respecting the law and not even accepting the first sanction of cleaning the sanctuary. (It is probably correct to consider that being accounted impious is also valid when someone does not pay the fine applicable in case of the introduction of cattle, as specified in l. 31). The translation proposed by R. Parker for ἐντὸς ἀπειρέτω, “let him be accounted impious”, is correct inasmuch as it does not refer to any trial; however, it does not take into account the fact that the Greek sentence does not say that the culprit is impious, but that he has committed an impiety.29 One could argue that the denunciation to the mastrii is an argument to consider that there would...
be a trial for impiety. However this denunciation bears essentially on the introduction of animals (l. 34: τὸν τούτων τι ποιεῖται) and ἀσέβεια seems to be an extreme case, considered only if the first mentioned sanction is not respected.\(^{30}\) Once again, the mere fact of declaring someone impious is sufficient in itself and is clear enough to people frequenting the shrine: their harmonious relationship to the gods – and specifically to Alektrona – and to the other people frequenting the shrine are at stake here. Accordingly, I think that ἀσέβεια is to be understood not exclusively in a legal perspective, but also in the framework of social control.\(^{31}\)

Another way to attempt to answer the question of sanctions entailed by ἀσέβεια is to look at the second group of texts, i.e. inscriptions concerning past events, which deal with offences \textit{a posteriori}, once they have already occurred.

**Impiety in past events**

Let us turn to “descriptive” expressions. By “descriptive” expression, I mean a structure which explains how things did actually happen or are happening, and not how things should or shall happen (= “preventive” structure). Epigraphic texts are formulated in such a way that we can say: “this action, or what happened in this specific context, \textit{is} an impiety and here are the consequences” or “this person is impious because he committed an offence and here is how he was punished”. It is legitimate to assume that, in such texts, we might have an answer to the question of the consequences of being regarded as impious.

Firstly, let us look at a fragment of the so-called attic stele (414 BC), on which the properties confiscated from men condemned for imitating the mysteries of Eleusis in Athens in 415 BC were written.\(^{32}\) Several men are said to have been impious in reference to the two goddesses, among whom a certain Phaidros son of Pythocles from the deme of Myrrhine:\(^{33}\)


\(^{31}\) On the notion of “social control”, see D. COHEN, \textit{Demokratie, Recht und soziale Kontrolle im klassischen Athen}, Munich, 2002. The focus of this book is on Athens, but many observations can be applied to the Greek world. The links between impiety and social control have not been studied and remain, in my opinion, to be analyzed. See also J.P. GIBBS, \textit{Control: Sociology’s Central Notion}, Chicago, 1989, p. 58: “Social Control is an attempt by one or more individuals (the first party) to manipulate the behavior of one or more other individuals (the second party) through still another individual or individuals (the third party) by means other than a chain of command or requests.” In the case of impiety, there was probably no total social exclusion, as it is doubtful that, say, someone cutting pieces of wood from a sanctuary would \textit{de facto} be a social outcast. However partial exclusions, in specific cults or specific social groups for instance, are possible.

\(^{32}\) On the name “attic stele”, see Pollux, X, 97: ἐν ὧν ἄττικος στήλης ἄνθισε τὰ ἑλευσινεῖα καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ἑλευσινεῖα ἀναγιγμέναι.

The following fines were paid by the persons who were impious in regard to the two goddesses, Phaidros son of Pythocles from the deme of Myrrhine.

This text refers to such a well-known event that we know what the offence implied by the participle ἀνέβασαντον was: these men had imitated a part of the rite from the Eleusinian mysteries. It should be noted that, while this offence had been linked to the mutilation of the Hermes even by ancient authors, we should consider that the main offence in the above inscription is only the imitation of the mysteries. The point is that the action carried out by those individuals is described as an impiety and that the sanction, on the other hand, consists of fines and confiscation of properties, possibly after a trial.

An inscription from Ephesos (4th century BC) concerns men condemned to death for their impiety towards Zeus:

The defendants of the goddess condemned to death on the basis of the following lawsuit notice: 'as theoroi had been sent by the city for the chitons for Artemis in accordance with the ancestral law, and the hiera and theoroi had arrived in Sardis and in the shrine of Artemis founded by the Ephesians, these men committed an impiety in regard to the hiera and insulted the theoroi. Penalty of the trial: death'. The following persons were condemned:

(list of names)

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34 The Phaidros son of Pythocles may be the same as the Phaidros mentioned by Andocides in the list of persons reported by Teukros: see On the mysteries, 15.
35 See W.D. Furley, Andokides and the Hermes: A Study of Crisis in Fifth-Century Athenian Religion, London, 1996, p. 46-48. The link between the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes, which took place at the same time, is not clear. It seems that Andocides and Thucydides, both contemporary with the events, tended not to assimilate them. However, subsequent authors blur the picture by linking them: see Plutarch, Alcibiades, 19. On a general level, ἀνέβασαν may be used for both offences, as we read in Thucydides that, once mutilated Hermes were discovered, people were prompted to report εἰ τῇ ἄλλῃ τῇ ὅλῃ ἀνέβασαν γεγενημένῳ (VI, 27). In the “attic stelae”, the main issue of interpretation is the mention of πέτα ἀμφότερα, which could mean that some persons have been condemned for both offences. However, W.D. Furley points out that this expression may have been added subsequently. Also, we may argue that only the imitation of the mysteries is referred to here because in another fragment of the stelae, it is mentioned more specifically: τὸ ἀνέβασαν τῷ πετῷ τῷ μονῷ (IG I.422, II. 226-227).
36 For details on the extreme consequences of these events, see Furley, A.D. (n. 35); Bruhtt Zaidman, a.e. (p. 2), p. 166; Baslez, a.e. (n. 3), p. 52-62.
37 Ι. Ephesos 2.
This inscription raises several issues, such as where the trial took place or what the exact mission of the Ephesian theoroi was. Moreover, if we accept the conjecture θεραξ in line 9 – as all the editors and commentators of the text have done – we still have to understand what it precisely refers to and what the relation of ἁσέβεια with them is. We can infer from the context that the θεραξ were the chitons offered to Artemis, possibly with other ἁσκημέτες, such as sacrificial victims involved in the rite. We can therefore guess that if the θεραξ were chitons, the condemned persons may have seized them from the theoroi.

The exact meaning of the verb used to qualify the offence towards the theoroi themselves, ἁσεβήσαν, is quite blurred also: for instance were the theoroi beaten or insulted? Despite these uncertainties, the point here is that ἁσεβήσαν clearly refers to an offence which led to a trial. Unlike the fragment of the attic stelae, however, we do not have sufficient knowledge of the context to understand with certainty what is implied by the verb ἁσεβήσαν.

We can find a similar case in the accounts of the Athenian amphictyonies in Delos, detailing different sources of income (374/3 BC). A short passage of these detailed accounts mentions eight Delian men who have to pay a fine and be permanently exiled. These men have been condemned for impiety because they expelled the amphictyonies out of a sanctuary and beat them:

οἱ δὲ ἰδρύοι Δήλων ἁσεβίσταις [ἐπὶ Χ.]κυρσάνδρος ἀρχοντος

135 Ἀθήναι, ἐν Δήλῳ δὲ Γαλαῖο τῆς μοίρας τὸ ἔποιη παραμείνον
[ἱππὸ ἁσπάσσα, διὶ [ἱππὶ ἐκ τὸ [ἱππὸ τὸ]πόλεμον τὸ Δήλοι ἠγον τὸς
Ἀμφικτύνονας καὶ ἔπετον (list of names)

These Delians have been condemned for impiety, under the archonship of Charisandros at Athens and Galaios at Delos. The penalty is the one written and exile for life, as they expelled the Amphictyonies out of Apollo’s sanctuary and beat them: (list of names).

The formulation of this inscription is not quite the same as the two previous ones. The action of the condemned men is not vaguely suggested by the verb ἁσεβήσαν but by two specific verbs: ἠγον and ἔπετον. The term ἁσεβίσας, on the other hand, is included in the expression ὀφλὸν ἁσεβίσας, a legal expression to be understood as ὀφλὸν δίκαι ἁσεβίσας. The expression “δικαίους ἀγον + genitive of the offence” is quite frequent and can be literally translated as “to be cast in a suit for...” Thus, even though the expression “δικαίους δίκαι + genitive” as

39 On this interpretation, see MASSON, Lc. (n. 38), p. 231. There is however no reason to assume that θεραξ here only denotes the victims of the sacrifice, as in L. ROBERT, “Sur des inscriptions d’Ephèse. Fêtes, athlètes, empereurs, épigrammes”, RPh, 34e série, 41 (1967), p. 34.
40 IG II² 1635.
41 The word δίκαις is not necessary and δικαίους can be followed by another word in the accusative case which denotes the sanction: οἱ μισοῦν δικαίους ζητεῖσαν (Demosthenes, Agam
a whole is a sanction, the word in the genitive case itself refers to the offence.\textsuperscript{42} The offence for which these men have been condemned is therefore considered an impiety. Does the difference of formulation in comparison with the other inscriptions imply other differences? Probably not. The formulation of the inscriptions is conditioned by the use of such or other such legal expressions. In this case we have “ἀφλοκοῦνεν δίκην + genitive of the offence”, whereas in the previous inscription the condemnation itself was referred to in “καταδικάζοντα + accusative of the sanction (θάνατον)”. We do not have *καταδικάζονται ἁσβεῖται, which would mean “condemn to impiety”.\textsuperscript{43} These differences therefore concern legal expressions and not impiety itself.

Can the three texts discussed here, which show the consequences of committing an impiety, shed some light on preventive texts and the expressions ἁσβής ἔστω, ἁσβεῖται and ἔνοχος ἔστω ἁσβεῖται?

Three elements can lead us to assume that there is no straightforward connection between preventive laws and reports of trials or that, in other words, you would not be prosecuted in a trial for impiety on the basis of a preventive law stipulating ἁσβής ἔστω for a specific offence. Firstly, as shown above, legal sanctions such as a prosecution are not explicitly mentioned as consequences of ἁσβής ἔστω. Secondly, there is a striking difference of gravity in the offences discussed in both cases. In the case of trials involving an impiety, the offences are very serious and threaten the harmony of the city itself: mysteries are not respected or officials are mugged. In the case of preventive laws, however, one can hardly assume that carrying away pieces of wood from a sanctuary or bringing in one’s cattle is such a threat to the society. Thirdly, formulations in ἁσβής ἔστω stipulate a status, whereas, in inscriptions detailing past events, ἁσβεῖται is mentioned as an offence: the Delians who assaulted the amphictions are not said to be impious, but are prosecuted for impiety.

\textsuperscript{42} Grammatically one may argue that impiety here is a sanction, pointing out parallels such as θάνατοι δικής μετέχεται (Thucydides, III, 57), but it does not make sense, since the sanction (τίμημα) is the fines and the exile.

\textsuperscript{43} From the examples given in LSJ, it seems that the expression καταδικάζοντας ἁσβεῖται meaning “condemn to impiety” would not be possible, because the genitive can only denote the sanction if the verb has a passive meaning, as in καταδικάζοντας θάνατον. Otherwise, the genitive refers to the person condemned: καταδικάζονται θάνατον ἔνοχος. With other verbs, such as ἔχων, the genitive θάνατον can indicate the sanction.
I would now like to address briefly the question of the existence of a “law against impiety”. In the examples seen before, the aim of preventive texts is not to define ἁσεβεία as such, with a structure such as “is impious anyone who + exhaustive list of offences”, but rather to categorize an offence as impiety. This is why it is so complicated to know whether a “law against impiety” ever existed. I think that the point of this paper – and the inscription we have seen with the adjective ἐγρόσσακος – may help us see this question a bit differently. With the notion of “law against impiety”, two points should be addressed: 1. should we consider that impiety was defined by a single law or that it was only defined by several documents? and 2. regardless of how impiety was defined, was there a single text specifying what would be the consequences of an impious act?

Firstly, let us examine the question of a potential single law defining impiety with different acts. It has been assumed that ἁσεβεία is an open category, in which anyone can try to include any fact at any occasion. As appears from the reflexions above, it is indeed difficult to propose a rigid definition of impiety. Ps.-Aristotle and Polybius of course provide short definitions (see footnote 1), but when compared to inscriptions, these are too general. By no means do they provide us with a list of detailed religious offences considered an impiety, and for which reasons. On the contrary, each epigraphic regulation is extremely specific. This discrepancy can be explained by the difference of evidence we deal with: in opposition to literary texts which can be quite rhetorical and provide very wide definitions of the concept of impiety, Greek law, enunciated through inscriptions, is above all casuistic. In preventive laws, impiety cannot be defined through rhetorical means. An orator could attempt to convince his audience that a specific act was an impiety, as in Demosthenes’ Against Midias, where a simple hit from Midias becomes an impious act towards the whole city. Demosthenes’ emphasis on impiety, though, is due to the fact that no law stipulated that Midias’ act was to be considered an impiety. In reality, considering someone as impious would depend on the different mentions of ἁσεβεία in preventive texts – the sum of which would form, to quote an adapted version of the Teian inscription, ἕπερ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ ἁσεβοῦς γεγοσμμένα ἔστι – but not on one law with a clear

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45 See Parker, o.c. (n. 3), p. 135: “Impiety’ is merely what on a given day a prosecutor can make it seem to be."

If no νόμος categorized a specific offence as an impiety – if, in other words, a specific offence was not taken into account in any of those νόμοι παρὰ ἁσβεῖας – it would always be up to someone to try to convince his peers that the offence in question was an impiety. But this forces us to discuss impiety out of epigraphic evidence, which is out of topic here.

But what about the second question, the existence of a “procedural” and not “substantive” law, stipulating what would be the proceedings in case of impiety and not impiety itself? Two examples could be used to prove the existence of such a law. Firstly, the expression νόμος ἁσβεῖας is mentioned in a few epitaphs from Lycia, to prevent anyone from burying another corpse in someone’s tomb. Moreover, a comparison between ἁσβεῖας and ἔρρης (“outrage”) may be helpful, as we find in two rhetorical passages the mention of a “procedural” law against ἔρρης.

The first one is in Aeschines, who refers to a law that we do not know (the few lines after λέγε τον νόμον are spurious) and summarizes it as such: “In this law it is written explicitly: if someone commits ἔρρης against a child – and indeed the hiring man commits ἔρρης – or a man or a woman, or any free person or slave, and commits something illegal towards one of them, it stipulates that there should be a γράφει ἔρρης and it adds the penalty that he should suffer or pay”. Demothenes, on the other hand, also refers to such a law, and additional details (role of thesmothetai, court, etc.) are mentioned in the law itself, though its authenticity is also problematic.

Accordingly, although a “procedural” law against ἔρρης may have existed, its form and content as we see in these rhetorical passages are not clear. Besides, we lack epigraphic parallels to these examples. We never find in decrees or cult regulations an expression like “if someone does something impious”, but rather
“if he does this, he shall be impious”. Supposing that a general text on impiety existed, its aim was to define a procedure in a specific case, as for instance a γραφή ἄσεβειας if someone sold sacred items\(^{55}\), but not the offences that were linked to this form of prosecution. Moreover, we do not know any general Lycian inscription entitled νόμος ἄσεβειας and used as a reference for epitaphs. If a law defining precisely impiety existed in the case of epitaphs, it must have had the form: “If someone commits impiety by opening a tomb, he shall be brought to court” or “if someone opens a tomb, he shall be prosecuted for impiety”. But the epitaphs that we know say: “if someone opens my tomb, he shall be prosecuted for impiety”. Casuistic, not general, prescriptions are therefore the norm both for defining impiety and stipulating its consequences. The law from Ialysos mentioned above would tend to confirm this point. It is written that the culprit will be ἄνογος τοῦ ἄσεβειας. The article τοῦ must have a demonstrative value and the expression should be translated “liable to this impiety”. Accordingly, it seems that impiety is often referred to with specific referents: you are considered as impious towards specific gods or you have committed a specific impiety. Only the expression ἄνογος ἄσεβειας, without article and without gods, has no referent. Apart from this more ambiguous case, therefore, it is clear that no general law about impiety is to be searched out of the different epigraphic texts known to us.

This also explains the formulation in the decree from Teos with a double mention of sacrilege: there is an array of texts in which sacrilege is mentioned and these texts are to be used as a reference for this specific case, but, on account of a lack of evidence, it is not founded to claim that there was a “law against sacrilege” either defining what “sacrilege” was or stating what would happen as soon as any sacrilege, in any occasion, was attested.\(^{56}\)

**Conclusion**

What should be remembered from this brief survey of impiety in epigraphic evidence? One can observe that when ἄσεβειας is involved on a *descriptive* level, clear sanctions are added (trial, fine, exile and so on): “X was impious towards Y because he did such a thing and is punished accordingly” or “X was condemned for impiety and here is the penalty”. But when the text becomes *imperative*, in the case of preventive laws, ἄσεβειας is used in syncopated forms: “if X does not respect the law, he shall be impious”. In such cases, the point is that you are

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\(^{55}\) As in IG II\(^*\) 1035, 1, 9: [καὶ ἔτσι] ἀποδομένων γραφής ἄσεβειας.

\(^{56}\) See the comment about Plato’s legislation against impiety in Brutt Zaidman, o.c. (n. 2), p. 167: “Précisément, ce n’est pas dans la cité athénienne, mais dans la cité platonicienne que se met en place une législation rigoureuse contre l’impiété, dont la définition occupe une large partie du livre X”. Even Plato does not provide a unique law against impiety, but rather laws against impieties of different sorts (868c: ἕνας δὲ τις ἄσιπης, τις τῷ παρὰ τοῦτῳ ἄσεβειας περιεχόμενον ἐπιθυρόμενον ἑκκούρασθαι ἐργοῦ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης), all of which should abide by a similar principle explained in a προοίμιον (907ε: κατά δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν ἐπιφανείας ἐπὶ τό προοίμιον ἄσεβειας πάντως νόμου).
regarded as impious, but specific sanctions are not automatically mentioned. Being impious can mean that from now on you will not feel at ease with the gods anymore, other people are allowed to reject you from the cult, etc. The problem is to understand how these two categories of texts may have been connected at some point. In other words, in the inscription regarding the cypresses in the shrine in Cos, where someone carrying away pieces of wood would be impious in reference to the sanctuary, we do not know any example of someone who actually committed such a wrong and was consequently mentioned in an inscription as follows: “X was condemned for impiety because he stole pieces of wood from the sanctuary and therefore X has to pay a fine of a thousand drachmae”. Attestations of ἁστεία in both contexts are two points between which we do not know how the synapses work.57

It seems, however, that impiety in cases such as the trial of the Delian men who mugged amphictions on the one hand, and impiety, say, in a ban on introducing animals, on the other hand, are quite different issues and should probably not be considered equally. Beating amphictions or grabbing ἰσηγξ in an official embassy are serious offences;58 in comparison, introducing cattle into a sanctuary or carrying away pieces of wood seem much more trivial. Accordingly, we could consider that the formulation ἄσημης ἅστω aims at being an efficient deterrent – just as huge fines of money – and, therefore, likelihoods of its real application would be very low – just as requiring ten thousand drachmae from someone would be quite unrealistic. At this stage, a Socratic ἄποικα is probably the wisest option.

Comparing attestations of impiety in epigraphic evidence also raises the complex issue of the definition of impiety. In this paper, I have briefly touched upon the “syntagmatic” level of impiety, i.e. how it is used in epigraphic expressions and how it is linked to other members of a sentence. But the “paradigmatic” level, what is to be understood behind the term ἁστεία out of the formulations themselves, as well as its implications on the relationship with the supra-human sphere, still have to be investigated thoroughly.

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57 See an analogous reflection for ἄτοιμα in E. Famerie, “La condamnation d’Arthmios de Zélia”, in Serta Leodiensia secunda. Mélanges publiés par les Classiques de Liège à l’occasion du 175e anniversaire de l’Université, Liège, 1992, p. 191: ἄτοιμα as a sanction is not to be considered in the same way if it appears in a preventive law or as an effective sanction. There are several instances where the sanction applied is not the one that was mentioned in the preventive law. It seems more difficult to say it with certainty in the case of ἁστεία.

58 So are the offences for which Socrates was prosecuted through a γραφή ἁσεβής. I have voluntarily left the dossier of Socrates’ trial aside here, but I am convinced that it can be reinterpreted through examination of the use of ἁστεία in epigraphic evidence.